The Promise of Popular Democracy: Origins

by: Rockridge Institute

Sun Apr 06, 2008 at 15:38


By Glenn W. Smith

"Democracy: a recognition of souls, all down the open road, and a great soul seen in its greatness, as it travels on foot among the rest, down the common way of living."

         D.H. Lawrence

Political theorist Robert Dahl once noted that twenty-five centuries of debate about democracy had not "produced agreement on some of the most fundamental questions about" it. It turns out that Dahl, like many theorists and historians, wildly underestimated the duration of the discussion. It's more like 5,000 years, or even 10,000 years. But he was right about the confusion. And if we don't understand what democracy is, or what the human values are that inform it, how can we achieve its promise?

When we examine the health of our political practices, differing concepts of democracy lead to different conclusions. Advocates of classical democracy, better termed popular democracy, focus on political equality and believe democracy to be a system in which the wisdom of individual citizens, expressed directly by initiative or through the election of representatives from among their neighbors, should determine outcomes. Elite democrats believe that human nature is essentially competitive and hierarchical, that issues are too complex for most people's level of knowledge, and that democracy requires only that some of the people participate in election contests, choosing leaders from among more knowledgeable and naturally gifted and powerful elites.

For the advocates of popular democracy, low voter turnout and systematic corruption of election processes are disasters. Concern for the common interest and individual autonomy and responsibility are balanced. Most importantly, popular democrats believe support for representative government depends upon bonds of sympathy and understanding among citizens and between the chosen representatives and those represented.

For elite democrats, as long as some reasonably well-informed citizens participate, tyranny is somewhat inhibited by a latent threat of voter rebellion. Turnout levels matter little (as long as it's the right people who vote); corruption of election practices is often shrugged off as the unhappy but inevitable result of competitive human nature. Self-interest prevails, and a little democracy goes a long way. Important decisions are left to a knowledgeable elite, but the people are given at least a token opportunity to have their say.

There is also a critical asymmetry in the public descriptions of these two kinds of democracy. Elite democrats can and often do disguise elite rule in the language of the popular democrats. Even Mussolini called his fascist state a democracy. True popular democrats, however, can hardly deploy the language of hierarchically oriented elites in the promotion of political egalitarianism. Plato famously recommended that rulers employ a "noble lie," to convince the ruled that their unequal status was due to pre-determined divine ordinance. Similarly, modern elites justify their overblown paeans to popular democracy as noble lies or necessary fictions.

The Noble Truth of Human Empathy

If popular democracy depends upon authentic bonds of sympathy and trust among citizens, these bonds cannot be faked. It could be said that popular democracy depends essentially upon the noble truth of human empathy.

In his essay on Walt Whitman quoted in the epigraph above, D.H. Lawrence says democracy is a "recognition of souls" embarked upon a common journey along a never-ending "open road." By defining democracy within the metaphor of Life as a Journey, Lawrence gives us democracy as a process of becoming. Democracy is not a thing whose essence can be captured or contained. Democracy must be enacted, the way, say, two lovers daily enact a marriage. It's up to democratic citizens, every moment of their lives, to enact democratic bonds with one another. Lawrence also speaks of the emergence of "a great soul seen in all its greatness," implying that empathy or the recognition of souls allows for the temporary ascendancy of skilled leaders among an egalitarian people. This is an important point. Critics of popular democracy often accuse egalitarians of simply being anti-authority. To the contrary, the practices of popular democracy arose in recognition of the need for leadership, with appropriate checks and balances in place to make sure these leaders continue to travel "on foot among the rest," and not ride ahead upon noble lies or political steeds of their own invention.

Both popular and elite conceptions call upon a dominant Myth of Democratic Origins, which locates the embryonic democratic impulse among the pre-Classical Greeks and credits its blossoming to the rise of a decidedly unemotional, Western concept of Reason. We can't underestimate the power of origin myths, because the widely shared folk theory of essences tells us that essences are contained in origins. But this myth of origins has skewed our understanding of democracy's past as well as its potential. Among other faults, it confuses human emotion with unreason, and so it discounts the importance of empathy to democracy.

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Rockridge Institute :: The Promise of Popular Democracy: Origins
According to the myth, some centuries after democracy first emerged in Greece, the 17th and 18th Century Enlightenment rejected emotionally laced superstition and its exploitation by religious authority. This led eventually to the American Revolution. The French Revolution's descent into the Reign of Terror is the myth's denouement, and it is often used to further justify the divorce of an austere, self-sufficient Universal Reason from emotion.

The motto of the French revolutionaries was, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." Fraternity, implying as it does egalitarian bonds of empathy, threatened Reason's unique authority to rule the passions, as well as "dispassionate" political authority's legitimate rule over passionate masses. Left unchecked by Reason, human passions would devolve into murderous paranoia and chaos. Empathetic bonds evoked by the word fraternity are seldom heard these days. When presidential candidate Barack Obama talks about an "empathy deficit," there's a bit of puzzlement in the press, as if he was talking about something completely out of place in the contemporary political game.

The primacy of austere Reason was contested, of course. James Madison well understood the role of "sympathy" in a democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville, no fan of French revolutionaries, credited the success of the young nation to Americans' "habits of the heart." Still, the Myth of Democratic Origins and Enlightenment faith in the power of unemotional Reason gave the edge to elite democrats.

As George Lakoff makes clear in his upcoming book, The Political Mind, there is no little irony in the post-18th Century political use of the Enlightenment idea of Universal Reason. This was the idea that we all have access to Reason, that Reason makes us equal, and that the reasoned pursuit of self-interest in a democracy will serve the larger interests of the community. Kant, like Plato, rejected human empathy from any formal role in morality or politics. Reason, stripped bare of emotion, became a privileged form of knowledge available to the philosophical and political elite. The elite would rule much like Plato had envisioned philosopher kings would oversee his ideal Republic. Rational knowledge was more available to some than others, and so Universal Reason came to justify decidedly non-universal ideals.

The scheme privileges the Harvard Business School graduate over the mother, the media consultant over the voter, and the celebrity pundit over the people. Popular democracy, however, recognizes the wisdom of the mother, of the voter who did not go to Harvard, of all the people whose interactions with others in their daily lives bless them with important knowledge about human relationships, knowledge that should take its place alongside so-called expert knowledge in a society with egalitarian aspirations.

The Myth of Democratic Origins, we now know, is wrong. Egalitarian, democratic practices were present among nomadic hunter-gatherers long before the ancient city-states of Greece. These practices - for instance, voting and term limits on leadership - can be found in ancient Mesopotamia, India, China and Greece.

Here I will briefly mention and point to some sources that describe the authentic origins of democratic practices. It's a first step in revitalizing the arguments for popular democracy. In subsequent essays I'll look more carefully at the role of empathy and at the misconceptions of Reason. Contemporary cognitive science has demonstrated the intimate ties between Reason and emotion. Modern archaeology and anthropology have uncovered the true origins of democratic practices in the deep past. Together, these discoveries lead us to new conclusions about the promise of democracy, and they bear directly on contemporary arguments over our political practices, arguments about: the integrity of our voting systems; the dominance of money and manipulative advertising in politics; the methodologies of opinion researchers; the dangerous corporate consolidation of media; the deterioration of public education; the artificial separation of economic and political spheres, which facilitates the pretense of political equality in a land of terrifying economic inequality.

James Madison, Hunter-Gatherer

In Federalist No. 52, Madison wrote of the need for "intimate sympathy" among chosen leaders and those who elected them. Speaking of the House of Representatives, he linked frequent elections for the House as the necessary enactment of declared common interest, mutual trust and understanding. "As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured," Madison said.

This "intimate sympathy" among equals is what anthropologists like Christopher Boehm have found among our earliest human ancestors. Madison's sympathy is enacted in frequent elections that serve two purposes: a check upon leadership and a ritual acknowledgment of the intimate ties among the people and between the people and their leaders.

This, of course, makes of voting something much more than a simple articulation of personal preference or rational self-interest. Seen in this light, voting is an instance of "ritual communication," in the sense James W. Carey distinguished ritual from the transmission of information across space from person A to person B. Ritual communication is performative. It is not just information but confirmation and re-creation of a shared reality that is communicated. Voting enacts the confirmation of community bonds that preserve individual autonomy. And it depends, in part, upon empathy, because my act of voting has meaning only if I can imagine such a meaning in your act of voting, as well as imagine that you participate in the ritual with a similar understanding.

If voting were given its proper due, if true universal suffrage were achieved, the egalitarian confirmation of common interests couldn't be faked because the act of voting itself is both means and ends. It would be similar to a minister's declaration, "I now pronounce you man and wife." The act of pronouncing, like the act of voting, performs the very truth it describes. We will save for later discussion the issues raised by democratic skeptics who have little faith that most people really know what's best for their community or, if they do, will act honestly upon that knowledge.

What Madison is saying, and what Tocqueville and others have echoed, is that the existence of a moral community is essential to democracy. And this kind of community - and democratic practices that grow from it - are just what Boehm and others have identified among nomadic hunter-gatherers of our distant past. In this respect, Madison was as much the egalitarian hunter-gatherer as he was a philosopher-statesman.

The True Origin of Democratic Practices

Boehm writes that social dominance hierarchies appear natural in the human species, but that the formation of moral communities led to "reverse dominance hierarchies" in which a community confirmed its egalitarian ethos and removed from power "upstart" bullies who threatened group solidarity.

Boehm argued that late Paleolithic people (40,000 to 10,000 years ago) successfully formed egalitarian alliances to circumscribe authoritarian abuses. Boehm writes that "it was not Americans, two centuries ago, who invented this interesting political way of life; nor was it the Athenians of ancient Greece. The 'democratic' origins I describe are not recent and historical, but evolutionary and ancient."

Others, such as Bruce Knauft, disagree with Boehm on some details but generally support the larger hypotheses. It is not Boehm's contention that humans are essentially egalitarian, as if he was resolving the Rousseau/Hobbes dispute in favor of Rousseau. Rather, he recognizes the dual motivations and locates the rise of democratic practices and the moral community in the resistance to authority many thousands of years ago.

"When upstartism does become active, so does the moral community: it unites against those who would usurp the egalitarian order, and usually does so preemptively and assertively," Boehm writes. "This scenario is true not only of hunting bands and egalitarian tribes, but also of ancient and modern democracies in which anti-authoritarian checks and balances become formally structured, and far more readily discernable."

Tactics employed by egalitarian moral communities included simple disobedience, direct challenge, ostracism, and, of course, assassination.
These moral communities could not have been achieved without the kind of social bonding empathy makes possible. That these early humans could empower their neighbors and protect each other from the threat posed by abusive leaders to their well being and the well-being of others is remarkable evidence of an ancient commitment to individual autonomy and shared social responsibility.

Democracies Before the Greeks

Much earlier than commonly believed, practices we would call democratic - term limits on leadership, empowered citizen assemblies - became formal means of avoiding violence while protecting and empowering individual autonomy and shared responsibility. Democratic institutions replaced ostracism and assassination. Assemblies, term limits, formal mechanisms for voting, law courts and codes of conduct for leadership existed among ancient peoples long before they emerged in Greece.

It was Thorkild Jacobsen, in an obscure but important study first published in 1943, who first noted the presence of democratic practices in ancient Mesopotamia. Prior scholarship, of course, had looked upon Mesopotamian civilization as representing the kind of tyranny Reason had helped Greek democrats overcome. Jacobsen cited the story of Gilgamesh (in the second millennium BC epic poem, "Gilgamesh and Akka"), which shows the hero seeking permission from not one but two assemblies, including an assembly of common citizens, before taking his city, Uruk, to war. He believed that democratic values of early Mesopotamia were translated into poetic and religious epic. Jacobsen wrote of "a state in which the ruler must lay his proposals before the people, first the elders, then the assembly of the townsmen, and obtain their consent before he can act. In other words, the assembly appears to be the ultimate political authority."

Recently, the distinguished anthropologist and historian of the Ancient Near East, Norman Yoffee, acknowledged that evidence of ancient Mesopotamian "councils great and small" and "councils of old and young" give credibility to Jacobsen's assertions.

Raul S. Manglapus, former Philippine President Corazon Aquino's foreign minister, while in exile during the Marcos years, wrote extensively about the evidence for earlier, pre-Western democratic practices. Manglapus makes the compelling point that anti-Eastern bias is often carried by a Myth of Democratic Origins that holds democracy to be an exclusive invention of the West and a great advance over the natural despotisms of the East. Just one of Manglapus' examples is the dramatic archaeological discovery in 1976 that revealed the lost kingdom of Ebla, circa 2500 B.C., in what is now Syria. Clay tablets showed kings elected to 7-year-terms, after which they were forced into retirement - with a pension.

In his book, The Theft of History, anthropologist Jack Goody echoes Manglapus and decries the Myth of Democratic Origins as an invention of Eurocentric political powers anxious to represent the rest of the world as despotic and barbarian. "'Primitive democracy', often a feature of small-scale societies, is given no room for consideration" by the Western democratic mythologists, Goody said.

"Democracy is assumed to be a characteristic of the Greeks and opposed to the 'despotism' or 'tyranny' of their Asiatic neighbors. That supposition is invoked by our contemporary politicians as representing a long-standing characteristic of the west in contrast to 'barbarian regimes' in other parts of the world," Goody wrote. He cites evidence for ancient democratic practices in Mesopotamia, India, China, and the Phoenecian colony of Carthage.

While focusing their study on a Greece much more ancient than the Myth of Democratic Origins contemplates as the birthplace of democracy, classicists and historians Kurt A. Raaflaub and Robert W. Wallace admit that "democratic institutions had a long prehistory, and their underlying mentalities and practices can be traced centuries earlier [than 5th or 4th Century Greece]. Popular assemblies, a measure of free speech, a strong sense of community, and mentalities including egalitarianism, personal independence, self-worth, and a refusal to be cowed by the rich, powerful, or wellborn are reflected already in the earliest literary documents from archaic Greece."

Today, despite the popular myth, there is really little academic dispute about the early existence of these democratic practices. Democracy did not wait for the accepted Western idea of Reason to bring it forth. It was born much earlier, emerging from ancient moral communities, empathy-based, egalitarian social and political networks formed in resistance to authority.

By deconstructing the Myth of Democratic Origins we can begin to dislodge the privileged status of unemotional Reason in our political theory and practice. Empathy and emotion were central to the origin of democratic practices. This is no trivial matter. Contemporary American political practices are built around mistaken notions of rational self-interest, a notion carried forward by the narrative of the mistaken myth of origins. The mistake is reflected in the methodology of opinion research, in political messages designed to appeal to self-interest, and in a collective inattentiveness to the corruption that plagues voting practices. Statistical samples do not feel empathy. People feel empathy, and every person matters in a truly democratic community.

The myth is relevant at the macro-political level as well. It's only a colossal arrogance, abetted by the myth, that would have us deceitfully crowing about bringing our wonderful invention, democracy, to Iraq, when it was in that very place that democratic practices arose thousands of years before there was something we would call the West.

As do most myths, The Myth of Democratic Origins contains some important truths. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution deserve their status as champions of democracy, and they were well aware of the tension between Reason and emotion. They, like their ancient forebears, saw that democracy was not a thing, but a process, a process it is up to us to enact. Though fearful of faction, the Framers knew that we could love our democratic country only through our affection for one another, affection often tested as we pray for the recognition of souls and try with love and Reason to find our way down an open road.


(Sources
and additional information about the Rockridge Institute's initiative, The Promise of Popular Democracy, can be found at the Rockridge Institute site.)


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Another Strand--The Iriquois Confederacy (4.00 / 2)
While most prehistoric examples of democratic have to be reconstructed from a great disatnce, there is also the example of the Iriquois Confederacy, an example so close at hand that it is said to have influenced the thinking of Franklin and Jefferson.  

Indeed, from a grand, historical/anthropological perspective, it might well be the case that anti-democratic systems are the real historical anomaly that needs explaining, rather than the other way around.

It seems that anti-democratic systems are esepcially suited to relatively quick, highly inequitable wealth extraction, founded, at bottom, on the weilding of force.  Otherwise, we tend to favor more democratic systems.

Our long prehistory of primarily nomadic subsistence hunting and gathering seems to have been conducive to democratic forms, if for no other reason than because we were smarter as a group than any one individual, and we needed to be as smart as possible.

It was only once we stumbled onto easy street that we could afford to get fat, dumb, and happy, and still manage to survive with inherently inferior governance systems that were highly vulnerable to operating system failures inside the skin of a single individual.

This may be a rather crude formulation, but I think it gets at a basic truth, and gives hope that we're headed toward increasingly more balanced, more democratic governance structures around the world.

"Senate passes expanded GI bill despite Bush, McCain opposition"


On the Haudenosaunee, or Iroquois (0.00 / 0)
A story about the Iroquois will be featured in Part II. Without getting ahead of myself, let me note two ritual phrases of these people, taken from their peace-making rituals. They were described to me by the late John Mohawk.

People who had been in conflict stand face to face. "I remove the tears from your eye," says one. "I release your voice," a former antagonist replies. Without empathy, such things can't be said. The first is a metaphor of protection, the second a metaphor of empowerment. Protection and empowerment are, I think, the very promises of democracratic covenant among the American people. Or they should be.

There are other words in these rituals, but it's easy to see from these the empathetic bonds established among the people.

I think your are right that tyranny or other undemocratic forms are the aberration. Making the illusion of their inevitability visible is the job you have so well articulated in your many posts on hegemony.


[ Parent ]
Agriculture is the start of exploitation (4.00 / 1)
Settled societies allow surpluses. And when there's a surplus, there's room for ambitious men to try and seize control of it and create a hierarchy to maintain that control.

And if there's one notable thing about societies on the European fringe that never achieved the significance of entities like the Carolingian and Ottonian empires, it's that they tended to be much less extractive. That's not to say that they weren't extractive, and they often followed in the footsteps of their more despotic neighbours, but there's a definite correlation.

It's this: those on the fringes tended to be in less productive areas, so there was less surplus, so there was less room for forcible extractive relationships.

Although it's hardly surprising - co-ordination amongst a peasantry at large in a pre-technological society is much harder than it is for the leaders of society to work together to share the spoils amongst them and keep the rest of society down.

Hell, even things like Magna Carta which are often counted as the first steps towards democracy fit within this model, and I tend to subscribe to the view, popular amongst much of the British left, that Anglo-Saxon democracy as opposed to oligarchy only really began with the Peasants' Revolt and the rise of movements like the Lollards.

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[ Parent ]
Definitely a connection (0.00 / 0)
There's no doubt that population growth, geographical extension, sedentary practices, and agriculture that produced surpluses opened up new avenues of exploitation by "bully" or "upstart" leaders.

It's also significant that empathy, a biological capacity evolved in face-to-face, small settings, is a little harder at a distance. We now know that humans often "infra-humazize" outgroup members, outgroups being a catchall that can mean another nationalality, another gang, another company, another neighborhood.

But proximity reduces this tendency. In other words, it's harder to strip another person of essential human emotions -- that's what infra-humanization is -- when we are standing in their presence.

But we've seen that democratic practices do emerge in extended, heavily populated settings. We can and do care about strangers. The trick is going to be to face the biological, neurological and institutional obstacles head on, and find ways of making easier what is hard....


[ Parent ]
The roots of democracy may in (4.00 / 1)
fact be pre-human.

Have you seen any of this kind of research?

http://www.newscientist.com/ar...

Montani semper liberi


Frans de Waal (0.00 / 0)
I am not familiar with the story you linked to, and it's really interesting. Thanks.

I am familiar with similar research among primates, such as the work of Frans de Waal, and Boehm also discusses this among human animal ancestors. Wikipedia has some good links on Waal.

I think I'll get into this a little bit more in the discussion of empathy that will come in part II. If you know of other research like that above, please forward along.


[ Parent ]
Sorry (0.00 / 0)
That's just something I ran across somewhere in my reading. I don't know much more about it than that.

But it does make a lot of sense.

And I would like to add I think you are definitely on to something with the idea that democracy may, in fact be the "natural" form of human self-organization. Among other things it would explain why rule by the elite must always be imposed, and maintained, by violence.

Montani semper liberi


[ Parent ]
Rigorously enforced (0.00 / 0)
That's exactly right. Authoritarians have to enforce their position, constantly. While egalitarians recognize the need for leadership, it appears that empathy-based solidarity evolved as a social practice to inhibit such enforcement. Even our brains allow for hierarchies of control. We can and do, for instance, refuse to empathize with an abuser. In other words, it takes control to inhibit control.



[ Parent ]
This Is, I Think, Very Deeply Rooted (4.00 / 1)
I think that virtually all the social animals have inherent democratic tendencies, simply because of the inherent logic that makes them ecologically fit.  This is not to say that that logic can't be exploited by opportunistic individuals who may establish themselves as autocrats.  But the underlying logic remains basically democratic, IMHO.

Social animals do not benefit from one individual being vastly superior to all others.  Genetic variability just doesn't work like that.  Only counter-factual myth-making allows for such ideas to arise.  Rather, what's key to their success is the fact that their cooperative behavior, primarily as rough equals, allows them to accomplish things that would be difficult, if not impossible, alone.

This is not limited to social mammals.  Migratory bird flocks, for example, typically rely on a fairly constant cycling of different birds taking the lead, where the most strenuous effort is needed.  No one is in control. No one orders them to do it.  It's simply part of their genetic behavioural endowment.  Genes supporting such cooperative behavior have a greater fitness than those that do not.

The same is true more generally about behavior labelled "altruism," that relates to the willingness of individuals to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their kin, thereby preserving the genes they have in common.  Dawkins wrote about this 30 years ago in a book rather misleadingly titled  The Selfish Gene.  It reflects the competetive mindset of the culture he comes from that he would label as "selfish" genes that are responsible for altruistic behavior.  I understand the logic, of course.  But it's not about the logic.  It's about what merits being stressed.

"Senate passes expanded GI bill despite Bush, McCain opposition"


[ Parent ]
Who gains from the counter-factual myths? (4.00 / 2)
Myths about human selfishness, brutality and aggression, myths used to justify the need for dominant leadership and unchallenged hierarchy, are always told by those that want to dominate a hierarchy. Cheney, for instance.

The contradiction at the center of their logic is amusing. Because we can't trust one another, we should trust those who teach us not to trust one another. It's never explained why the dominant should escape the mistrust.


[ Parent ]
Because... (0.00 / 0)
It's never explained why the dominant should escape the mistrust.

You can trust them to beat you up if you don't?

No, seriously, I think that we have to see this as an example of a primative cross-wiring, similar to that which occurs in children raised by violent parents, in which love and violence associated with one another. But in this case, it's a much more general phenomena that seems to be rooted in secondary, rather than primary, socialization.

This sort of cross-wiring occurs at such a basic level that it's extremely difficult to step back from it and see it objectively, much less muster the resources to escape from it.

"Senate passes expanded GI bill despite Bush, McCain opposition"


[ Parent ]
at the extreme of strict father morality (0.00 / 0)
If you have the cross-wiring, you may, strictly speaking, not be able to step back from it.

As George Lakoff sez, the primary value and goal of strict father morality is the maintenance of its own power. Strict fathers don't lie, because they can't lie. I mean, whatever they say and do is necessarily above challenge. They also don't have to explain the holes in their logic.

We'll have to explain those holes, and hope their recognized.

I agree that it's not unlike a child of abuse or violent setting. And those hard-wired cross-wires can't be erased, but many people -- biconceptuals --  have established other networks of connections in their brains that allow different moral views in different settings. And the old hard wires can be wired around. It just takes persistent advance of new, deep frames. Easy to say.



[ Parent ]
More Work Needed On BiConceptuals (4.00 / 1)
I'm sure there's more known about this than I'm aware of, but I'm also sure that there's much more that needs to be known.  However, it seems to me that very few people are probably utterly devoid of both frameworks.

It's probably much more accurate to be speaking of functional biconceptuals, whereas most other folks could be called latent biconceptuals, meaning, at the very least, that they are familiar enough with the other framework to make sense of what folks are saying speaking from the other framework, even if they don't talk that way themselves.

In fact, one metaphor I've been toying with for some time--more in terms of cognitive developmental levels, but it could apply here as well--is that of colloidal states.  The continuous phase is the dominant worldview, the dispersed phase is the subdominant one.  It doesn't really function in a coherent manner, but it's there, nonetheless, and could at least plausibly could account for understanding someone speaking out of the subdominant worldview. And if the balance changes over time, then interesting things can happen.


"Senate passes expanded GI bill despite Bush, McCain opposition"


[ Parent ]
Very intriguing (0.00 / 0)
This colloidal states idea as it relates to biconceptualism. I'm not competent to hold forth on it, but I'm going to follow your advice and check it out.

[ Parent ]
Actually, I First Thought of It In Terms of Cognitive Development (0.00 / 0)
Along the lines of Kegan's typology, which conceives of successive levels in terms of shifts in which what is subject at one level becomes object at the next:

Kegan's Subject/Object Schema of Cognitive Development
StageWe Are:
Subject
(structure of knowing)
We Have:
Object
(content of knowing)
Underlying Structure
1Perceptions

SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS

Impulses
Movement


Sensation
2Concrete

POINT OF VIEW

Enduring Dispositions
Perceptions

SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS

Impulses
3
Traditionalism
Abstractions

MUTUALITY/
INTERPERSONALISM
Relationship


Inner states
Concrete

POINT OF VIEW

Enduring Dispositions
Needs, Peferences
4
Modernism
Abstract Systems

INSTITUTION
Relationship-Regulating Forms

Self-authorship
Abstractions

MUTUALITY/
INTERPERSONALISM
Relationship

Inner states
Subjectivity
Self-consciousness
5
Post-
Modernism
Dialectical

INTER-
INSTITUTIONAL

Self-transformation
Abstract Systems
Ideology

INSTITUTION
Relationship-Regulating Forms

Self-authorship
Self-regulation
Self-formation

 It's an elegant model, but it doesn't lend itself to describing the continuity that is observed in transition between levels.  But a colloidol model would do that.

"Senate passes expanded GI bill despite Bush, McCain opposition"


[ Parent ]
Patriarchy vs Matriarchy (0.00 / 0)
Matriarchal cultures value all members of group equally -- Patriarchal societies are hierarchical, placing the highest value on powerful men, and the lowest value on women and children.

There is some evidence that the first cities were the matriarchal Dravidian culture along the Indus River, predating  Sumer in the fertile crescent. The Aryan conquest of India brought in the patriarchal hierarchy of Bhramin god kings, while the remnants of the Dravidian culture were concentrated into today's Tamil culture, in South Eastern India and Sri Lanka. Tantra was a 10th century pentecostal revival of Shivan Hinduism, with a strong egalitarian reaction against the Caste System.

The narrative of the Greek origins of democracy also overlooks the Roman Republic, and how it gave way to the Emperors and the rubber stamp Senate. We all understand why today's elites want us to overlook this example.

As for modern Anglo Saxon democracy, the Icelandic Althing and the egalitarian meritocracy of the viking era Norse culture were the indirect precursors of the Magna Carta.

Njal's Saga is the greatest of the Icelandic Sagas -- it traces how a blood feud led to civil war, culminating in the burning of Njal and his household, followed by the reconciliation of Kari and Flossi, and the restoration of peace. Njal was considered the wisest Lawspeaker of the Althing, but the cycles of revenge and petty jealousies led to the breakdown of the system; eventually, the King of Norway intervened, and restored order -- sans democracy.

To paraphrase Franklin, the founders of America gave us a democratic republic -- if we can keep it.

     


Althingi was an oligarchy (4.00 / 1)
I love Njals saga as much as anybody, but don't believe anybody who tries to tell you that the Icelandic commonwealth was democratic or some kind of great anarcho-capitalist experiment. It was an oligarchy, pure and simple.

More people were involved in government, but only because Iceland was so poor and so recently settled that a vastly stratified hierarchy wasn't possible. The average farm worker or shepherd still had more or less zero income. And the system broke down in the thirteenth century as power became concentrated in few enough hands that you could get clear wars for power and territorial polities.

As for Viking meritocracy, don't believe that in the slightest. A longship utilised the most sophisticated boat technology to be found in Europe and they will not have come cheap. Even if you were just serving on board somebody else's ship, you'd need the money for armour and a helmet to get very far.

Add that to a religion that seems to have deliberately perpetuated the social hierarchy (I can bore you on Rigthula if necessary, but believe me that nobody wants that) and a society in which nobility of descent was crucial, and you have a society that remained profoundly unequal. It was less unequal than most of the rest of Europe, but that's because Scandinavia was poorer than the rest of Europe, and the equality is least evident in Denmark, which has the best farming land.

I'd also say that the Roman Senate is even less democratic than those too, but I don't have as deep a grounding in the historical background as I do for Viking Age Scandinavia.

Forgotten Countries - a foreign policy-focused blog


[ Parent ]
Go Ahead! (0.00 / 0)
(I can bore you on Rigthula if necessary, but believe me that nobody wants that)

Make my day!

"Senate passes expanded GI bill despite Bush, McCain opposition"


[ Parent ]
Quick summary (4.00 / 1)
I'll go over this fairly quickly, since I've never bothered to read it in the original Old Norse and eddic poetry in general tends to send me to sleep (I'm much more in to the king's sagas.)

It's an origin myth in which the god Heimdall (aka Rig) creates the class system by visiting three households in turn, enjoying their hospitality and sleeping between them that night. In each case a child is later born who bears the name of one of the major classes.

The first home is inhabited by a poor couple named Greatgrandfather and Greatgrandmother (I forget the ON names here, so I'll most of these names are translations.) They have a child named Thraell (essentially equivalent in meaning to slave). Then his marriage (to someone called Slavegirl) is mentioned and his descendants are named - and by descendants I mean a number of attributes, mostly derogoatory, are given which one can assume relate to the aristocratic conception of the thraellir.

The second home is inhabited by a couple named Grandfather and Grandmother, who are better off. Their son is named Karl (farmer) and the pattern is repeated, although the attributes are not derogatory any longer.

It's the same with couple #3, Father and Mother, who are richer and so the hospitality is better. The only change to the formula is the youngest son, Kon. The ON for young is ungr and their word for king is konungr. He's shown to know runes - although it's hard to interpret that, as it is whenever runes are mentioned - and at the end a crow invites him to go off to "ride horses and command armies".

Interpreting and dating the poem is difficult and you can never rule out Christian influence with eddic poetry, since it's only preserved in much later manuscripts, but this does seem to present a fairly simple picture of the class system as it would have been perceived in Scandinavia about a millenium ago.

Forgotten Countries - a foreign policy-focused blog


[ Parent ]
I'd like to believe in much of what you are saying, (4.00 / 2)
but there are a few reasons why I see some of your basic points as problematic.

First, the early democracies you cite were very small.  There is a very crucial problem of scale that Jane Mansbridge may have described best (although one of Dahl's first books was about this problem).  It appears that very different kinds of governance structures operate effectively on different scales.  In terms of what I've been writing about recently, for example, you can't "community organize" effectively across an entire state the size of Wisconsin, but you can within a city.  We need to understand better what kinds of challenges these different scales create for "democratic" governance, and for redefinitions of what this means.  The problem of scale has been well known since the Greeks at least.

So, if this is what you are doing, you can't make simple analogies between early democratic communities and a democratic society.

Further, there are real problems with the empathy argument.  Hannah Arendt, for example, argued that this was a key problem with past efforts to create popular democracy.  They assumed that you could have "empathy" with large numbers of people.  But I think there is good evidence that this is, in fact, not possible. In a sense, this is a problem with our cognitive equipment which was designed for small communities, not for enormous societies.  

Of course you are right that emotion is always implicated in reason.  But this doesn't necessarily give you the kind of traction you want it to.  In fact, I think there is a lot of evidence that we are also equipped with strong emotional tools for distingushing between "us" and "them."

Arendt argued that the equality of a democratic society was one of the most artificial of human achievements, and I think she had a good point.  What is "natural" is inequality.  Of course, in very small spaces, this inequality takes on a very personal and "empathetic" character, if you will. But it doesn't take on the same meaning in much larger social spaces.

This feels a lot like what progressives at the turn of the century were dreaming about.  Perhaps that's unfair, and I'm willing to listen--I thought aspects of your book were quite insightful.  

But the society we want, and the society we can likely have may be quite different.

--Aaron Schutz (Core Dilemmas of Community Organizing)


But the problem of scale (0.00 / 0)
cuts both ways.

It's also possible that autocracies and oligarchies can only function in certain size societies, societies small enough where they can successfully punish the disobedient.

Montani semper liberi


[ Parent ]
To your points (4.00 / 2)
Your points go to the heart of the work ahead. They are urgent, even. Let me provide a couple of answers and maybe clear up a concern or two.

We need to understand better what kinds of challenges these different scales create for "democratic" governance, and for redefinitions of what this means.  The problem of scale has been well known since the Greeks at least.

The problem of scale is real, as you say. Democracy gets harder the larger the population and the greater that population is extended. I believe part of this problem has to do with empathy and the difficulty of abstracting to strangers. Another part has to do with the variety of deceitful manipulations available to bullies or "upstarts" in more advanced, sedentary, surplus economies.

What I'm trying to do here is find an end to the string so we can begin to untangle it. I believe this problem is approachable if we can discard our worn-out, rationalist idea of what it means to be human and begin with a deeper understanding of our natural, biological and emotional inter-connections with one another.

you can't make simple analogies between early democratic communities and a democratic society.

I am trying to call attention to the human origins of democratic practices, not trying to analogize to earlier times or pretend some kind of utopian return is possible. Of course it's not. But, I think, it is important to understand that there's something about human being that wants democracy, that it existed long before Reason's smarty pants told us what it should be.

Hannah Arendt, for example, argued that this was a key problem with past efforts to create popular democracy.  They assumed that you could have "empathy" with large numbers of people.

Arendt's real problem with empathy grew from her work with Heidegger and from the work of Edith Stein. Like Stein, Arendt worries that empathy implied a loss of self, a giving up of autonomy to with the eyes of another. It turns out that empathy does no such thing.

For instance, mirror neurons fire when we see another perform an action and when we perform the same action. But we have inhibitor neurons, too, meaning my arm doesn't have to act like it's throwing a football when I watch the quarterback on the field. Similar mutual inhibitors keep my sense of self, my identity, fully intact when I empathize with another. It's just that my views of the world and of others are enriched.

As I've agreed, the problems with democratic associations among large numbers of strangers is a real one. The point, though, is to understand what humans are, cognitively and inter-subjectively. Of course we are limited, but there's no reason to let the difficulty of the task persuade us to ignore our basic natures because it's hard to provide for the many what we can provide for the few.

As a side note, in much of the research cited above, those early Mesopotamian political organizations left intact many local democratic practices. The macro organization of the state, and the power of the so-called despot, have been greatly over-estimated. See Yaffee.

there is a lot of evidence that we are also equipped with strong emotional tools for distingushing between "us" and "them."

Yes, we are equipped with such tools. New research on what's being called "infra-humanization," the habit of denying basic human emotions to outgroup members, is rather alarming. Proximity mitigates against it, and that would appear to reinforce the argument about empathy at small scales.

We're complex critters. What can I say.

What is "natural" is inequality.

Don't mistake my egalitarian aspirations for any kind of suggested leveling. We need experts, we need leaders, some can throw a baseball further than others. Equality means recognizing the fundamental human dignity we share. It means we act cooperatively, using our bonds of sympathy and natural attachment to keep these leaders walking with us and not ahead of us.

This feels a lot like what progressives at the turn of the century were dreaming about.

There was more than one kind of progressive at the turn of the century. One mistake many types of progressives made was the "rationalist" error, believing reason could set us free. It was actually progressives who wanted to bring business management practices into government, for instance. I come from a fundamentally different place.

There were all manner of utopians, of course. I like their spirit still, but I'm not one. I don't have a recommendation for perfect democracy. I do believe we should revisit what democratic practices should look like in light of the emerging picture of human being. In an earlier speech of mine that Paul analyzed, I said our current practices are built on an idea of the human that is just as faulty as using leeches to cure illness.


[ Parent ]
Nicely put (4.00 / 1)
My only quibble is with your response on Arendt.  Her issue was with our ability to have empathy with more than specific, knowable individuals.  She didn't have any problem with empathy with actual people--in fact she was renowned for her capacity for "friendship." As she noted in On Revolution, the problem was that empathy in a group setting quickly turns into "pity" which is not the kind of emotion that can drive the kind of social practice you are pointing towards.  

Whether or not she is right about her "pity" argument, there is a whole ongoing discussion about "care" theory in feminist theory that, in part, tries to grapple with this challenge of "caring" for collectives and for distant "others."  Personally, I am convinced about the empathy issue.  I can care about you. I can't care about them.  It seems like you mostly agree in your response--can't entirely tell.

There are all kinds of complex ways of combining the local and the larger than local, which always seems to be where this argument goes, and we need to think more about these.  Arendt wanted a vast pyramid of little spaces reporting up to each other.  Jane Mansbridge's work on the ERA, among others, seems to indicate that it is really difficult to combine local face to face settings of "empathic" democracy, if you will, and larger structures in this way.  I struggle with this issue, myself.  This was a key challenge that John Dewey, for example, was unable to solve.  

Another issue, here, is about what is artificially creatable in some relatively limited amount of time, and what necessarily grows organically out of the long-term evolution of particular societies.  Today we live in a society in the US where local, tight-knit communities of the kind that would have been the norm centuries ago are mostly lost. I'm not saying it isn't possible, but what is creatable now will be quite different from the rich social practices these old communities embodied.

This is made worse by privilege on the one hand (rich people who never talk to their neighbors) and poverty on the other (people in the inner-city who are too afraid to talk to their neighbors).  And then there is the empirically established separation between class and racial networks (middle-class people talk to other middle-class people in the same neighborhood and not to working-class people, etc.)  This creates not just the challenge of how to layer larger structures onto local ones, but how to create these local ones at the same time.  

I hope you will talk about Putnam's recent article where he found that there is less "social capital" (I hate that term--it's so vague) in diverse communities than in monocultural ones.  There are all kinds of difficult problems related to the tendency to "exit" particular diverse dialogic settings instead of take the time to raise a "voice" in them that I am also grappling with. There are a couple of other key books that make much the same point.

I don't have any issue with trying to think out of the box, or with trying to imagine how we can be more democratic in various ways.  But I want to make sure we keep our feet as much on the ground (and in the often unhappy details) as possible.  And it seems like you are planning to do that.

Anyway, interesting stuff.  I think we're mostly in agreement, but the devil is in the details.  I'll keep poking my head up as you move forward.

--Aaron Schutz (Core Dilemmas of Community Organizing)


[ Parent ]
With you on the ground (0.00 / 0)
Maybe I should have said Arendt was suspicious of empathy, and she got this from Heidegger's general impatience (he thought it smacked of Cartesian isolated selves and beside the point to his exploration of Being), and, I believe, Stein's specific rejection. (Stein, who went on to become a nun and hero to the Catholic Workers movement.

We know a great deal more about the neuro-physiological workings of empathy than any of these 20th century thinkers could know, of course. And Arendt had a concept of "enlarged mentality" or something like that, that sounds like empathy.

I am not familiar with Mansbridge, but plan to follow your lead and look into it.

In any case, thanks for your thoughtful and penetrating responses.


[ Parent ]
A nice summary of (0.00 / 0)
Mansbridge's issues can be found here:

http://books.google.com/books?...

--Aaron Schutz (Core Dilemmas of Community Organizing)


[ Parent ]
This Is A Problem Being Dealt With By Anti-Genocide Activists (0.00 / 0)
The book Darfur/Darfur: Life/War and the photo exhibit it accompanies was conceived at least partly because of this very point--that the suffering was too large for people to handle.  The photographs bring it down to individual human scale.  I heard an interview about it earlier today on KPFK:

DARFUR/DARFUR: LIFE/WAR is a powerful collection of images from some of the world's most celebrated photojournalists who have documented an ongoing genocide that has claimed more than 300,000 lives and has displaced about 2.5 million people.

Launched in September 2006, Darfur/Darfur, the exhibit to which the book is the companion, consists of over 150 color and black-and-white images by seven international photojournalists and one former U.S. Marine and has gained massive national and international attention. It has been shown in museums such as the Hammer Museum, Los Angeles, the Eastman House, Rochester, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C., and the Jewish Museum in Berlin. Future venues include the Institute of Contemporary Art, Boston, the Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto, and FORMA, Milan. In January 2007, Darfur/Darfur became the first exhibit on the crisis to be presented on the African continent.



"Senate passes expanded GI bill despite Bush, McCain opposition"

[ Parent ]
Let Us Now Praise Famous Men (0.00 / 0)
That's what Darfur/Darfur Life/War reminds me of, Walker Evans and James Agee. I just ordered it. Thanks for the tip.

By way of addendum to my above note about Arendt, I don't want to leave it without acknowledging my puzzlement at a thinker who appeared to practice empathy but remained skeptical about it. And when she stretches Kant's "enlarged mentality" of judgment, she seems to complain about its absence from Kant's politics.

Perhaps Arendt's trouble with empathy is that she understands it to mean a great body-snatching power of inhabiting others, of becoming them while remaining oneself. But the concept of empathy assumes, instead, that lodged in oneself is the whole human potentiality, and to try and understand what animates another person, in whatever time, place, and culture, one must sooner or later look inside oneself...

George Kateb said that, in an essay that wrestles with this problem with Arendt. I think there's a glimmer of a solution to the problem of distance, because empathy is never distant. I don't literally feel the pain of another, the pain is inside me.

I know I'm leaving a loose end looser here, but...

Kateb again:

There are limits to empathy of course, even in the most creatively introspective person...just as I never understand another person fully, so I cannot understand myself fully.


[ Parent ]
Never thought Kateb really "got" Arendt (0.00 / 0)
It's been a few years since I was looking at Arendt's work with any intensity, but I was never impressed with Kateb's reading.  Margaret Canovan probably wrote the best book IMHO (her second and more recent one).  But no need to get academically anal about it :)  And I think we basically agree on the core point.  

I love Arendt's work, but I also thought she had some very odd ideas (like her distinction between "work" and "labor") where she carried her insights much too far.

One of the key questions, here, is about how "flexible" human beings are.  People like Dewey assumed that we were very flexible, and that all kinds of cultural structures were possible.  One of the things the new cognitive science is teaching us--and you are certainly more up on it than I am-- is that we are less flexible than we thought--more hard-wired, although there are myriad creative ways of leveraging the range of different parallel processes that are always running.    I'd be careful about thinking that we really "understand" human beings and how they work, though.  We are and may always be a very long distance from that.  Scholars have been saying for centuries that they've finally "figured" us out, always to their ultimate chagrin.  

--Aaron Schutz (Core Dilemmas of Community Organizing)


[ Parent ]
Maybe I should say: (0.00 / 0)
That we are at least understanding that humans are not exactly as we thought we were.

And that the new things we know about ourselves could make a big difference in the ways we live together -- if we would take another look at the political environments we've created for ourselves, then redesign them in light of our new knowledge of thinking and being.


[ Parent ]
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